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EU Justice and Home Affairs and the 
Eastward Enlargement:  
The Challenge of Diversity and EU  
Instruments and Strategies 
I.  Introduction: the AFSJ as a special challenge for 
enlargement 
With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May  1999 the 
development of EU policies in JHA was transformed into a fundamental 
treaty objective, Article 2 TEU providing for the maintenance and the 
development of the European Union as an  “area of freedom, security and 
justice” (AFSJ).  This new integration objective was at the same time 
strengthened by the introduction of a range of new policy objectives, the 
communitarisation asylum, immigration and other issues of the former 
“Third Pillar”, the incorporation of the Schengen acquis, new and more 
appropriate legal instruments and improved judicial control. This, and the 
results of the Tampere European Council of October 1999, led to a further 
expansion of the scope of policy-making in justice and home affairs, with 
dozens of new legislative acts being adopted, a considerable number of 
new legislative initiatives and even the establishment of new bodies - such 
as the prosecution agency Eurojust and the European Police College. There 
is no other example in the history of EC/EU integration process of an area 
of  previous loose intergovernmental cooperation only having made its way 
so quickly to the top of the Union’s political and legislative agenda. Jörg Monar 
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The major and rapidly developing integration project that the AFSJ has 
undoubtedly become has also emerged as a formidable new challenge for 
the eastward enlargement. There are four problem factors which make this 
challenge different from those in other EU policy-making areas:  The first 
of these factors is the security rationale of the AFSJ. Both the AFSJ and the 
incorporated Schengen system are implicitly based on the concept of an 
emerging common single internal security zone which introduces a new 
powerful dividing line between countries inside and outside of this security 
zone. This clearly results from the way in w hich the two key concepts of 
the AFSJ,  “freedom” and  “security”, and their interrelationship are defined 
in the main texts adopted by the Union so far. As regards the concept of 
‘freedom’ the 1998 Vienna Action Plan emphasises that the new Treaty 
opens the way to giving freedom  “a meaning beyond free movement of 
persons across internal borders” and that includes the “freedom to live in a 
law-abiding environment” protected by effective action of public 
authorities at the national and European level.
1 The Tampere Conclusions 
continue this line of thought by describing it as the  “challenge” of the 
Treaty of A msterdam  “to ensure that freedom, which includes the right to 
move freely throughout the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of security 
and justice accessible to all”, a project of which it said that it corresponds 
to “frequently expressed concerns of citizens”.
2 The main emphasis here is 
obviously on a concept of freedom based on internal security provided 
through effective law enforcement and access to justice. This is very much 
in line with the new EU Treaty objective of Article 29 TEU that the Union 
shall  “provide citizens with a high level of safety” within the AFSJ. The 
underlying idea of guaranteeing citizens’ freedom through a high level of 
safety has clearly major implications: It implies a fundamental distinction 
between a  “safe(r) inside” and an  “unsafe(r) outside” with the EU’s 
frontiers as the dividing line and law enforcement as the key instrument to 
maintain and further e nhance this distinction. The reference to European 
citizens’  “concerns” adds a powerful legitimacy claim to the  “area of 
 
1  Vienna Action Plan (OJ No. C 19/1 of 23.1.1999), paragraph 6.  
2  Tampere Presidency Conclusions (Council document SN 200/99), paragraph 2. EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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security” and its full implementation.
3 The implication for the a pplicant 
countries is that if they cannot fully operate according to the rules and 
standards  of this  “area of security”, they endanger the  “safe(r) inside” and 
therefore provide a justification for the EU to keep them (in whatever form) 
outside of the AFSJ. This rationale is particularly developed in the context 
of the Schengen group in which uniformity in the implementation of 
minimum standards and standard procedures have become a crucial issue, 
supported by many forms of mutual and collective evaluation, and this 
obviously i ncreases further the pressure on the applicant countries.  The 
second factor, partially related to the security rationale just mentioned, is 
the particular sensitivity of justice and home affairs in the national political 
context. Policy areas such  as asylum, immigration, border controls and the 
fight against crime and drugs are issues of major concern to citizens in the 
current Member States and consequently also of considerable importance 
for p olitical parties and elections. Whereas the governments of the current 
EU Member States may be able to count on a certain degree of passive 
acceptance of the economic and financial costs of enlargement any costs in 
terms of increased internal security risks would be extremely difficult to 
justify and sustain. Reports in the media on potential enlargement related 
problems with illegal immigration and organised crime, whether 
exaggerated or not, attract considerable attention and are eagerly seized 
upon by political forces opposed to the enlargement and/or pursuing 
xenophobic objectives. As a result concessions to applicant countries in the 
areas of justice and home affairs carry the risk of appearing as a 
compromising on citizens’ safety for the benefit of an anyway so far not 
overwhelmingly popular eastward enlargement, a risk which few, if any, of 
the current EU governments will want to take. The fact that both Italy and 
Greece  - in spite of b eing longstanding EU members  - had to wait seven 
years after their accession to the Schengen
4 before they were declared 
“Schengen mature” and f inally fully admitted to all the operational parts of 
 
3  This rationale is also taken up in the Tampere Conclusions - and even with a 
slightly populist undertone - which state that “people have the right to expect the 
Union to address the threat to their freedom and legal rights posed by serious 
crime” (Tampere Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 6). 
4  From 1990 to 1997 and 1992 to 1999 respectively. Jörg Monar 
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the  system indicates that justice and home affairs are not an area prone to 
compromises for the sake of political integration. Several Schengen 
members, most prominently Austria and Germany, have already made clear 
that such compromises are not on offer during the accession negotiations
5 
and it seems increasingly evident that the Schengen countries are preparing 
themselves for maintaining the Schengen external border controls vis-à-vis 
the new eastern Member States well beyond the time of accession. 
The third f actor is that  preparations for accession in the areas of justice 
and home affairs started relatively late. Still five years ago few EU experts 
would have predicted the huge new integration project of the AFSJ as it has 
emerged since Amsterdam. These rapid developments came all the more as 
a surprise to the eastern applicant countries which well into the second half 
of the 1990s continued to regard the old Third Pillar with its relatively 
limited intergovernmental acquis as a rather marginal issue in the a ccession 
process. During 1997, however, they had to realise  - especially because of 
the decision on the incorporation of Schengen  - that they were facing a 
formidable new hurdle, and  adaptation to the EU acquis in justice and 
home affairs started to rank much higher on the agenda for both pre-
accession related internal reform and requests for EU support. The Union 
itself did little to bring the accession preparations in the areas of justice and 
home affairs to an earlier and more effective start. Only in 1997 a 
reorientation of the PHARE programme allowed for the first time the 
financing of more substantial measures in the areas of justice and home 
affairs and only from the beginning of 1998 enlargement problems in these 
areas started to be treated with a sense of urgency in the Council. Even 
then, however, the EU added to the problems of preparation of the 
applicant countries because it was not able to finally define the (limited) 
 
5  Giving evidence on 5 July 2000 before Sub-Committee F of the European Union 
Committee of the House of Lords Dr. Gerald Lehnguth, Ministerialdirektor at the 
German Ministry of Interior, declared that it was the German position that “there 
can be no dropping of security standards and that the newcomers must keep to the 
standards laid down by the old members” and that “no exceptions can be made for 
any particular country” (House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union: 
Enlargement and EU External Frontier Controls, Session 1999-2000, 17
th Report, 
October 2000, Minutes of evidence, para. 270-271). EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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EU acquis in justice and home affairs before March 1998 and the (much 
more considerable) Schengen a cquis in various steps until May 1999. A 
crucial document on the Schengen acquis - the Common Manual on Checks 
at External Borders  - was only made available to the applicants in 
September 1998 and even then without some of the confidential annexes.
6 
As a result the applicant countries only gradually arrived at a complete 
picture of what would be asked from them during 1998/99, with 
corresponding delays in preparations and the development of more 
specifically targeted EU support measures.  Overall, therefore, effective 
preparations for taking on the justice and home affairs acquis started  - at 
least in the Luxembourg Six  - more than half a decade later than for the 
internal market acquis. 
The fourth factor is the  rapid growth of the EU acquis following to the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. While the applicant countries 
had not yet fully finished assessing all the implications of the incorporation 
of the Schengen acquis as at 1 May 1999 the EU was already well under 
way to expand all parts of the acquis on the basis of the new objectives and 
legal instruments introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. In the first year 
after the latter’s entry into force more than 20 important legally binding 
texts were adopted which automatically become part of the acquis which 
the applicant countries have to take over. As a result of the Tampere 
decisions, a more active role of the European Commission and the 
resolution of the most immediate problems between the United Kingdom 
and Spain over Gibraltar t his pace could even further increase during the 
next few years. During 2000 the Council adopted no less than 75 texts 
which all add to the acquis the applicant countries are expected to take over 
and implement.
7 There is therefore a risk that in certain areas the 
combination of a late start for effective preparations and the speed of 
developments on the EU side may lead some applicant countries in certain 
areas to fall further behind the EU a cquis rather than to catch up with it. 
 
6  Decision of the Schengen Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 (SCH/Com-
ex (98) rev 2). 
7  The full list is available on the Council’s justice and home affairs web site: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/justice_home/index_en.htm.  Jörg Monar 
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While these problem factors make justice and home affairs a special kind 
of challenge for the enlargement process the central issue to tackle remains 
that of reducing or managing the diversity
8 which the eastward enlargement 
is likely to import into the AFSJ in such a way that it will not provide a 
justification for a lasting exclusion of new Member States from the AFSJ 
or endanger its further development. In the following we will first identify 
the main dimensions of this diversity and then indicate and evaluate some 
of the possible strategies and instruments to reduce or manage diversity 
before and after accession. 
II.  The main dimensions and problems of diversity in 
the context of the eastward enlargement
9 
1.  The first dimension: diversity in legislation 
Legislation on justice and  home affairs matters is the dimension of 
diversity where differences between the EU acquis and the applicant 
countries are most “visible” and measurable. 
Legislative alignment with the EU acquis has been the first priority for the 
applicant countries for m any years now and continues to be the key 
element in the European Commission’s annual reports on the progress 
made by the candidate countries towards accession. All applicant countries 
have made major efforts and - as this can be clearly taken from the 1998, 
1999 and 2000 Commission reports  - also considerable progress with 
bringing their legislation into line with the EU acquis. Nevertheless strong 
 
8  The term “diversity” will be used in the following as a generic denominator for 
differences between the justice and home and home affairs systems of the eastern 
applicant countries on the one hand and the EU justice and home affairs acquis on 
the other. 
9  This part of the report is to a large extent based on interviews with officials of 
national ministries, the Council of the European Union and the European 
Commission and the use of a large number of classified documents from national 
ministries and the Council of the European Union. The author was also able to draw 
on some information available to him in his function as specialist adviser to the 
Select Committee on the European Union of the House of Lords. EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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elements of diversity still exist with varying prospects for their removal 
until the time of accession. 
Asylum policy.  In this field some of the applicant countries, like Hungary, 
are already largely aligned with the EU acquis. Most of the Luxembourg 
Six
10 have adopted the main principles and structures of the EU acquis but 
that a certain degree of diversity persists as regards procedural guarantees 
for asylum seekers. It seems likely, however, that this diversity could be 
largely eliminated by 2003-2004 through additional legislation. In some of 
the other candidate countries there are still serious shortcomings such as the 
absence of effective appeal procedures and insufficient procedural 
guarantees during the initial application phase. The likely later accession 
date, however, should give those as well enough time to adopt the 
necessary legislation. 
External border controls. This is a field where legislation plays a less 
prominent role than in other relevant justice and home affairs areas. The 
main and most relevant elements of diversity are to be found in the field of 
implementation (see below). Nevertheless it is of importance that at the 
time of accession the applicant countries have completed the legal 
transformation of the border guards or police forces into a professional 
non-military force compatible with EU standards. In the Luxembourg Six 
the necessary legislation is already now largely in place. As regards the 
Helsinki Group the picture is more varied with serious deficits especially in 
Bulgaria and Romania where even the demilitarisation process of the 
border guards has not yet been completed. 
Visa policy. Diversity in legislation on visa policy is a major issue for the 
enlargement process in the areas of justice and home affairs. The full 
adoption of the EU’s visa r egime  - which, because of the incorporation of 
Schengen, means the adoption of the more restrictive Schengen visa list  - 
will force all eastern applicant countries to introduce visa requirements for 
most of their eastern neighbours which had previously e xempt from such a 
requirement. This will not only contribute to the above mentioned 
disruption of existing cross-border economic relations but is also politically 
 
10  Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia. Jörg Monar 
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sensitive because neighbouring countries are likely to regard this as an act 
of forced exclusion. Whereas some countries, such as Estonia, Slovenia and 
- more recently
11  - Slovakia, have m ade considerable progress with their 
alignment of visa legislation with the EU acquis others  - especially those 
with larger ethnic minorities on the other side of the borders (such as 
Hungary)  - have shown some reluctance to adopt the EU’s visa regime. 
Poland is likely to fully legally adopt the EU visa regime only fairly close 
to or upon the date of accession which could lead to additional problems of 
implementation. Diversity in legislation on visa requirements could 
seriously disrupt the EU’s visa regime and is unlikely to be negotiable in 
terms of granting temporary derogations to candidate countries. Yet the 
recent compromise reached in the Council on the lifting of the visa 
requirement for both Bulgaria and  - under certain conditions  - Romania 
should reduce problems in this area quite considerably.
12 
The fight against illegal immigration.  In this field there is still a major 
degree of legislative diversity. Whereas the Czech Republic, Estonia and 
Hungary, for instance, have brought their legislation largely into line with 
the EU acquis there are still important differences in the relevant legislation 
of other applicants (especially as regards termination of residence, the 
implementation of expulsion orders, rules on entry for the purposes of 
gainful activity and the admission of third-country nationals for study 
purposes). The alignment with the EU acquis is not made easier by the fact 
that the latter is to a considerable extent based on soft-law instruments 
whose scope is sometimes open to different interpretations. To a varying 
degree all of the applicant countries also still have to negotiate a number of 
readmission agreements with third countries in order to bring their 
readmission policy into line with the EU’s. Considerable differences also 
still exist as regards legislation against illegal employment. Overall, 
however, many applicant countries have already made substantial changes 
 
11  Through a substantial revision of the Law on Refugees in September 2000. 
12  On 16 March 2001 the Council adopted a Regulation determining a list of third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas which provides that in the 
case of Romania the visa requirement will only be lifted on the basis of a 
Commission report on specific undertakings of Romania in the fight against illegal 
immigration (OJ No. L 81 of 21.03.2001). EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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to their legislation and it seems unlikely that any of them will have 
problems completing this process until the respective time of their 
accession. The real problems are again to be found in the area of 
implementation (see below section II.4.). 
Police cooperation. The applicant countries seem to be well under way to 
fully align their legislation with the EU acquis, with Slovenia apparently 
being in the leading position at the moment. This process has been made 
easier by the general overhaul of police legislation and organisation all 
applicant countries went through after the transition. Much progress has 
been made as regards  the formal establishment of the national law 
enforcement contact points which are of crucial importance to effective 
police cooperation. Diversity continues to exist, however, in specific 
sectors of cooperation. All applicant countries still have, for instance, to 
bring their national provisions on hot pursuit and cross-border surveillance 
operations into line with the important Schengen acquis in this area. The 
same applies to a large extent to EU framework provisions on the exchange 
of liaison officers. Another area where there is still a considerable degree of 
legislative diversity is that of data protection where the EU acquis is quite 
demanding, especially with regard to participation in Europol. Some 
applicant countries still lack comprehensive legislation on the 
independence of the data protection supervisory a uthority and the respect 
for the data protection rights of the individual. Yet in these areas as well 
some countries have recently made considerable progress
13 and in all of the 
applicant countries preparations for appropriate legislation are under way 
and should be in place at the time of accession. Late adoption of the 
relevant legislation, however, could cause certain problems with effective 
implementation after accession (see section II.4.).  
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters.  Effective judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters is to a considerable extent dependent upon the 
compatibility of penal codes and codes of criminal procedure. Most of the 
 
13  Such as the Czech Republic which in September 2000 signed the 1981 Council of 
Europe Convention on the p rotection of the processing of personal data and 
established the office for Personal Data Protection as an independent supervisory 
authority.  Jörg Monar 
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applicant countries either have already completed some substantial reforms 
in these areas or a re close to completing them. Nevertheless considerable 
deficits still exist. Considerable gaps continue to exist, for instance, in the 
legal provisions relating to direct contacts with foreign judicial authorities 
for the purposes of mutual assistance in criminal matters and as regards the 
alignment of national legislation with the December 1998 EU Joint action 
making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation. Even 
among the Luxembourg Six there are still some countries which have not 
yet ratified all the relevant Council of Europe Conventions. Of crucial 
importance for the effectiveness of judicial cooperation in the fight against 
organised crime is legislation against money-laundering. In this area the 
applicant countries have all adopted basic legal instruments but the process 
of falling into line with the EU acquis is not yet completed. The overall 
picture in judicial cooperation in criminal matters is therefore still a rather 
patchy one with significant degrees of legislative diversity persisting in 
certain areas. This could mean that formal adoption of the acquis will be 
completed only very shortly before or upon accession which, again, could 
increase implementation problems (see section II.4.). 
2.  The second dimension: diversity in policies 
The EU acquis is still far from comprising single common policies in 
central areas such as asylum and immigration. Yet on the basis of the 
existing formal acquis, the Amsterdam reforms, the Vienna Action Plan 
and the Tampere decisions the EU has recently increasingly moved towards 
a number of common objectives and priorities in these areas which are part 
of the  “political” acquis the applicant countries will be expected to take 
over. Diversity in  this area is much more fluid and less easy to establish 
and to measure than in that of the formal acquis, especially because there 
are still major divergences in justice and home affairs policies between the 
current 15 Member States. Yet additional diversity in policies imported by 
the next enlargement is quite likely and it could matter. Two examples may 
demonstrate this point: EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
 13 
The first example is that of external border management. During the 1990s 
the EU has moved more and more towards a tightening of e xternal border 
controls. For some Member States (especially current  “frontline” countries 
like Austria, Germany and I taly) border security through sophisticated and 
extensive checks is clearly a priority in the area of justice and home affairs. 
This will not necessarily be the same for future new eastern Member States. 
They may at the moment give a relatively high political priority to the 
upgrading of their eastern border controls because  this is part of the 
conditions they have to fulfil for EU membership. They clearly also have 
an i nterest of their own in keeping illegal immigration and cross-border 
crime at their eastern borders under control. Yet for several of the applicant 
countries taking over the EU/Schengen external border regime entails 
major costs in form of a disruption of relations with ethnic minorities on 
the other side of the border, political relations with neighbouring countries 
and cross-border trade which,  especially in the Polish case, is of 
considerable economic importance.
14 As a result the full implementation or 
even further development of the EU/Schengen external border acquis could 
become much less of a priority for some of the new Member States after 
accession, perhaps even an area where they would seek exemptions from 
the current a cquis against established EU objectives and priorities. Such a 
diversity in fundamental policy orientations could obviously lead to major 
tensions in the Council. 
The second example is that of the fight against money-laundering. 
Measures against money-laundering have become a core area of EU 
“policy” in the fight against organised crime and ranks high on the current 
Member States’ agenda as this was again confirmed by the progress made 
during 2000 towards the adoption of the directive and - in the Third Pillar 
areas  - the framework decision on money laundering. The applicant 
countries have not been left in any doubt about the importance the EU 
attaches to uniform and efficient measures against money-laundering and  - 
as pointed out above  - have already adopted a number of basic legal 
 
14  See on this point House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union: 
Enlargement and EU External Frontier Controls, Session 1999-2000, 17
th Report, 
October 2000, para. 10-12, 15 and 44-46. Jörg Monar 
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instruments in line with the EU acquis. Yet for at least some of the 
applicants this area may be much less of a priority. One reason for that is 
their particular dependency  - as economies in transition  - on the influx of 
foreign capital. A very strict application (or even tightening) of the rules 
against money-laundering could have (or be perceived to have) a 
dampening effect on the inflow of capital. Prospective new Member States 
can therefore take the view that they can less afford this sort of restrictions 
than current Member States. Another reason is that the full implementation 
of the EU’s acquis and o bjectives in this area requires quite considerable 
financial and administrative efforts (for the setting up of a special agency to 
monitor financial operations, for instance) which the applicant countries 
might prefer to reduce or postpone as far as possible. For both reasons the 
priorities of at least some of the applicant countries in this area, as well as 
in the fight against organised crime in general, could be quite different. The 
result would be a case of policy diversity which  - after accession  - would 
have its impact on decision-making in the Council. 
3.  The third dimension: organisational diversity 
Organisational diversity h as to be regarded as a serious issue for the 
enlargement in justice and home affairs because the implementation of 
common principles, measures and standards of cooperation is in need of a 
minimum of compatibility and interoperability between national 
institutions and structures. During the 1990s the quickening pace of 
integration in justice and home affairs has led to a number of important 
organisational adaptations in the administrative, policing, border control 
and judicial structures of the current EU Member States. These have 
involved  - and continue to involve  - mainly r estructurations in ministries, 
the creation of special units and contact points in police forces, border 
guards and the judicial administration as well as the creation of better 
supporting structures for judicial and police liaison officers, all this in order 
to facilitate effective cooperation in the different justice and home affairs 
areas. The applicant countries face the double challenge of still having to 
complete the process of reforming their law enforcement and judicial 
structures and to make further specific adjustments r equired by the EU EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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acquis. Substantial differences between institutions and structures in the 
current EU Member States, whose compatibility and interoperability have 
significantly increased during the 1990s, and those of the applicant 
countries could seriously reduce the latters’ capacity to effectively 
implement the EU acquis after accession. M ajor diversity continues to exist 
primarily in four areas: 
Border guard o rganisation. In most of the applicant countries external 
border controls were in the past largely a matter for the armed forces. This 
led to a border control system based on regular army patrols, watch-towers 
and  “heavy units” in reserve positions in the r ear. None of these elements 
fits with the Schengen external border control regime which is based on 
specially organised and trained border police units under full control by the 
ministries of interior, relies heavily on highly trained mobile units with 
sophisticated technical equipment and modern control techniques such as 
“risk-profiling” and  “risk-testing”. Although most applicant countries have 
by now made the transition towards a professional non-military border 
guard staff shortages, insufficient training and equipment problems still 
keep some elements of the old military border control system in being, 
including the occasional use of troops for border duties. Even those 
applicant countries which have made much progress towards the creation 
of professional modern border guards, such as Estonia, Hungary and 
Poland, still have considerable structural problems as regards effective 
interaction b etween border guards, police forces and customs authorities 
which is crucial for an effective border management according to the 
Schengen standards. The applicant countries also still have to struggle with 
rivalries between military and civilian structures in the control of external 
borders. An additional structural problem is posed by the fact that as a 
result of accession some of the applicant countries will have to shift the 
bulk of their border control operations from their traditionally strongly 
guarded western borders to their eastern or south-eastern borders to which 
much less attention had been paid in the past. In Poland, for instance, the 
border infrastructure in the sectors bordering the former socialist  “brother 
states” is in many parts still severely underdeveloped and will require 
massive funding to be u pgraded to the Schengen standards. The shift of Jörg Monar 
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material and personnel from western to eastern or south-eastern border has 
already begun and will be reinforced by a new ambitious  “Border 
Management Strategy” which was adopted in March 2000
15 but involves 
major challenges as regards financing, infrastructure and the reorganisation 
of border guard forces. 
Organisational structures in the areas of asylum, immigration and visas. 
Most of the applicant countries have not yet completed the institutional and 
structural reforms needed to comply with the requirements of  the EU 
acquis in the area of asylum. Concerns have been expressed on the EU side 
over an insufficient demarcation of  competencies between asylum 
authorities, border guards and police and the lack of adequate reception 
structures. Understaffing of the relevant units is another serious structural 
problem in most applicant countries. It contributes to increasing backlogs 
of pending asylum applications. Most of the applicant countries have not 
yet made all necessary changes to effectively manage applications for visa 
and residence permits in foreign representations. The efficiency of visa 
issuing procedures in many applicant countries is reduced by the absence of 
computerised systems. Even where these exist other structural problems 
can seriously limit their effectiveness. The change of organisational 
structures in all these areas does not only require further legislation, 
restructuration and new approaches to inter-service cooperation but also a 
considerable financial effort which some applicant countries are unlikely to 
be able to afford in time before accession. 
Organisation of police forces.  Police forces in all the applicant countries 
have gone through several rounds of reform and adjustment during the 
1990s. While these have generally helped to modernise policing structures 
and to put clear blue water between today’s forces and their tainted past 
under the communist regimes, numerous reorganisations and frequent 
changes in senior positions have also created a certain instability and 
disorientation in many forces. This applies even to applicant countries 
which are well advanced with their restructuration efforts. As this was 
 
15  Polish Ministry of the Interior: Polska Strategia Zintegrowanego Zarzadzania 
Granica, Warsaw, June 2000. EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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recognised in a Polish Government Report on the Security Situation of May 
2000 Polish police forces suffer from a particularly complicated 
organisation, lack of inter-forces coordination and inadequate management 
structures which are an important factor of operational inefficiency and 
staff demoralisation. In many cases the reorganisation process is not yet 
completed. Further structural problems include a shortage of experienced 
senior officers due to the dismissal of officers with a questionable political 
past and major r ecruitment problems because of relatively low salaries and 
the better pay in private security services. In many cases effective 
coordination structures with other institutions involved in the fight against 
organised crime and money-laundering, such as the ministries of finance 
and the border guards, are still missing. As regards the internal structures 
required for integration into the EU police cooperation networks and 
structures the applicant countries are only introducing those at a relatively 
slow pace. The Slovenian government, for i nstance, has announced that 
some of the necessary steps such as the creation of the n ational Europol 
unit (which will provide liaison officers) and the unit for monitoring the 
implementation of Schengen provisions will only be implemented upon 
accession. The later these organisational change are introduced, however, 
the less likely they are to  work e ffectively immediately after accession. 
Problems persist also in the organisation of the data-protection authorities 
which are of central importance for the participation in Europol and other 
computerised EU cooperation networks.  
Organisation of the judiciary.  A functioning and independent judiciary is 
not only a pre-condition for the effective participation in central parts of the 
EU justice and home affairs acquis but also part of the Copenhagen 
political criterion of the  “rule of law”. Since the H elsinki European Council 
of December 1999 all eastern European applicant countries are considered 
to have met the  “rule of law” criterion but there are still considerable 
problems as regards their judicial systems. These include the 
overburdening of the judicial system in the applicant countries because of 
lack of staff, huge backlogs of cases, inefficient procedures and the 
unavailability in several applicant countries of a lternative methods of 
dispute settlement (such as arbitration, mediation and reconciliation). Since Jörg Monar 
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large numbers of the senior judges were removed from office following the 
transition all applicant countries also have difficulties with insufficient 
experience of mostly young judges. A further problem is corruption in the 
judicial system  which flourishes under the impact of inadequate 
surveillance and low pay. A r ecent government commissioned survey in 
Slovakia indicated that about 20% of the parties involved in court 
proceedings experienced corrupt b ehaviour from judges.
16 Shortcomings 
have also been reported in terms of non-execution of sentences because of 
weaknesses in the organisation of the judiciary (Slovenia), deficits in 
fact/evidence-finding (Hungary) and absence of regular publication of 
case-law (Czech Republic) and serious problems with the quality of 
judgements at lowest-level courts (Estonia). Further reforms are under way 
in all applicant countries. Yet because of their considerable financial, 
administrative and training implications the ambitious organisational 
reforms introduced or under way could still take well beyond 2003 years to 
be effectively implemented. As experience in current Member States has 
shown new judiciary structures which are put into place normally need 
considerable more time before they work satisfactorily. 
4.  The fourth dimension: diversity in implementation 
Diversity in implementation is likely to be the biggest challenge of the 
enlargement process in the areas of justice and home affairs. The applicant 
may well be able to bring all of their legislation i nto line with the EU 
acquis until accession, they may even fully align their policy objectives 
with those of the EU and be able to achieve substantial progress with their 
institutional and structural reforms. Yet all this will not be enough to ensure 
the e ffective practical implementation of the EU acquis which requires 
extensive training, high standards and consistency in the application of 
rules and procedures, an adequate technical infrastructure and vigorous 
action against specific dangers such as corruption and violation of data-
protection rules. The EU acquis, as it has been transmitted to the applicant 
 
16  European Commission: Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, 
Brussels, 8 November 2000, p. 17. EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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countries, is much more precise on required legislative and organisational 
changes than on practical implementation standards where much more 
space is  given for interpretation. The current EU Member States  - and 
among those e specially several Schengen members  - have become 
increasingly concerned about this problem area of the enlargement process, 
taking even the view that the European Commission was not  paying 
enough attention to implementation problems in its monitoring work. 
Concerns over the applicants’ potential implementation deficits were 
actually the main reason for the establishment by the Council on 29 June 
1998 of a special mechanism for the collective evaluation of the enactment, 
application and effective implementation by the applicant countries of the 
EU  acquis in justice and home affairs.
17 M ajor diversity in implementation 
standards and capabilities could indeed s eriously affect the functioning of 
core elements of the AFSJ after enlargement, and relatively high degrees of 
such diversity can be identified in all areas of justice and home affairs. 
Asylum policy. In the past the applicant countries had to process only very 
small numbers of asylum applications. Yet these numbers are likely to 
increase significantly over the next years, especially after accession to the 
EU. In some cases this is already happening, and serious backlogs are 
emerging in the respective countries. Hungary, for instance,  has seen its 
asylum applications  “explode” from 1998 onwards, which has led to 
administrative overburdening, inadequate legal procedures and a huge 
backlog in the treatment of asylum applications. Lack of staff training 
reduces both the effectiveness and f airness of asylum procedures even in 
countries where comprehensive and relatively generous legislation is now 
in place. Lack of adequate training also exists among the judges in charge 
 
17  Joint Action 98/428/JHA, OJ No. L 191/8 of 7.7.1998. The core piece of the 
collective evaluation mechanism is a group of experts (‘Collective Evaluation 
Group’) which has the task - under the supervision of the COREPER and in close 
cooperation with the Article 36 Committee - of preparing and keeping up-to-date 
collective evaluations of the situation in the candidate countries on the enactment, 
application and effective implementation of the Union acquis. The Member States 
make available to this group all relevant material compiled by national authorities, 
including information on their direct experience of working with the candidate 
countries, reports from Embassies and intelligence services and reports from the 
Council of Europe. Jörg Monar 
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of the j udicial review of asylum cases. Further difficulties include 
inconsistencies in the application of deadlines for lodging applications, 
uncertainties as r egards the interpretation of new legislation recently 
introduced in line with the EU a cquis and a lack of communication of 
asylum authorities with their foreign counterparts. Lack of modern 
technical equipment and means of data-communication could also seriously 
hamper an effective implementation of the Dublin Convention  - for 
instance in the area of electronic fingerprinting  - if these shortages are not 
removed before accession.  
External border controls.  Of crucial importance for the functioning of the 
Schengen system is an equal degree of control at external borders and the 
carrying out of these controls in accordance with uniform principles.
18 
Whereas some countries  - such as Estonia  - have made considerable 
progress with the adoption of EU/Schengen border control practices others 
still have to overcome serious deficits. Most of the applicant countries’ 
border guards currently lack computerised central data search systems and 
sufficient  “all weather” night and day observation equipment, and only a 
small minority of the border crossing points have on-line connections with 
other law-enforcement agencies. Currently none of them would be able to 
participate effectively in  the SIS. Inter-agency cooperation (with customs 
authorities, police etc.) on border control issues  - an important element in 
the EU/Schengen acquis - is in many cases poor and often affected by an 
unclear delimitation of tasks. The effectiveness of the border guards’ work 
suffers in all applicant countries from a lack of systematic training in 
modern control and search techniques such as  “risk profiling” and  “risk 
testing”. Cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries  - another 
important element of  the EU/Schengen border regime  - varies considerably 
depending on political factors and the willingness of local units to engage 
in such cooperation. A particular problem  - which might however be 
resolved if Slovakia joins the EU at the same time as the Czech Republic- 
is the Czech-Slovak border which the Czech authorities  - for 
understandable political and economic reasons - are reluctant to treat as an 
 
18  See Article 6 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement. EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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external one. There is only limited patrolling and considerable laxness in 
controls at crossing points, a nd the Czech-Slovak border has become a 
major thorough-fare for illegal migration. Observers from current EU 
Member States have also expressed concern over lenient controls at the 
Hungarian-Romanian and Polish-Ukrainian borders which can as well be 
explained by specific political (ethnic minorities) and economic (important 
cross-border trade) reasons. 
Visa policy. Taking over the EU/Schengen visa regime will be a 
considerable challenge for the applicant countries in administrative and 
practical terms. As the result of the EU/Schengen  “negative list” especially 
Hungary and Poland will have to issue much larger numbers of visas at 
consulates and ensure adequate checks of these visas at the borders or at the 
carriers’ steps. All applicant countries will have to screen applications more 
thoroughly, introduce controls of visas inside the country, check on the 
required invitations and deal much more effectively with problems of 
overstay. The smooth o peration of the EU/Schengen visa regime depends 
on a balance between a tough application of the rules towards undesirable 
aliens and a more flexible attitude towards families, businessmen and 
students. I t took the current Member States a long time to arrive at - or at 
least to come reasonably close to  - this balance. It  seems therefore rather 
unlikely that the applicant countries will find it from one day to the other if 
- as this is the case for Hungary and Poland, for instance - they are planning 
to fully i ntroduce the EU’s visa policy acquis only shortly before or upon 
accession. Even those applicant countries which have made much progress 
with the formal alignment of their visa policies - such as Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic  - are likely to proceed only gradually with the full 
implementation because of traditional p olitical ties and economic links with 
other former socialist countries. Both experience and training is still 
lacking in crucial areas such as the issuing of consular visas. A 
considerable diversity in implementation could be the consequence, and 
this may  well mean laxness, administrative disorder and additional risks of 
corruption well beyond the time of accession. 
The fight against illegal immigration.  In this area a strict and consistent 
application of legislation and established procedures is of paramount Jörg Monar 
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importance. Yet even those a pplicant countries which have made 
considerable progress with aligning their legislation with the EU acquis 
still have considerable difficulties with effective implementation. In the 
Czech Republic, for instance, there was evidence in 2000 for a lack of 
consistency in the a pplication of rules on entry, expulsion and residence as 
well as fines. In P oland shortcomings have been identified with the 
implementation of deportation and expulsion orders. So far the readmission 
policies of all applicant countries are largely focussed on readmission to 
neighbouring countries. Expulsions towards remote countries of origin, a 
standard practice in the EU/Schengen context, are in general not 
implemented.  Of considerable i mportance in the EU  approach towards the 
fight against illegal immigration are measures against illegal employment. 
All of the applicant countries have some legislation against illegal 
employment in place, but in many cases this legislation is not effectively 
implemented. In  Hungary, for i nstance, immigrants seem to be able to find 
work without permits rather easily, and the relatively low fines imposed on 
employers seem to have little deterrent effect. A further problem for 
effective action in the fight against illegal immigration is document 
security. In many cases passports are easily forged and visas issued are 
neither machine readable nor equipped with holograms. The upgrading of 
enforcement practices and special measures such as increasing document 
security will all require considerable investments by the applicant countries 
some of which do not currently treat these as a priority. If these steps are 
only taken very close to the date of accession, however, lack of experience 
and training may reduce their effectiveness well beyond the time of 
accession. It should be noted that diversity in i mplementation standards as 
regards the fight against illegal immigration has given rise to particular 
concerns in some of the current Member States because the final 
destination of large  numbers of immigrants entering illegally the applicant 
countries tends to be a current EU Member State.  
Police cooperation. Diversity in implementation standards in the area of 
police cooperation is to a considerable extent caused by the unresolved 
organisational problems of the applicant countries’ police forces which 
have been mentioned earlier (see above section II.3.). Frequent shake-ups EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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in structures and senior positions, low pay and poor working conditions 
tend to demoralise staff and to increase recruitment problems which in turn 
reduce the effectiveness of policing work. Salaries and working conditions 
are not a formal part of the EU acquis but nevertheless important. Adequate 
and timely pay of police officers is not only an important element of EU 
policing standards but also of major importance for the fight against bribery 
and corruption. Practitioners in current EU Member States’ ministries are 
concerned that organisational changes (adding  “new boxes” to 
organisational charts) are not matched by t he allocation of sufficiently 
experienced staff, adequate resources and effective management. 
International cooperation with other European police forces is often 
hampered by a unclear division of  competencies, competition between 
national law enforcement  agencies as well as the lack of foreign language 
skills. The effectiveness of n ational contact points and liaison officers in 
the context of the EU networks could be seriously reduced by a high degree 
of diversity in management techniques, procedures and w orking standards. 
Training is another crucial issue. Although all applicant countries have 
improved their training programmes specialised training is generally 
lacking as regards new types of crime such as money-laundering, 
intellectual piracy and high-tech crime. Diversity of implementation 
capabilities caused by a combination of lack of training, resources and 
equipment could have particularly negative consequences in the fight 
against economic crime where the ongoing liberalisation process in the 
applicant countries creates new opportunities for crime. In the area of data-
protection  - crucial for EU police cooperation - a relatively late adoption of 
the necessary legislation and organisational structures could result a lack of 
adequate experience and established confidentiality working standards at 
the time of accession and a correspondingly high degree of diversity in the 
application of the EU’s data-protection a cquis. Finally one also has to 
mention deficits in equipment as a major source of diversity in 
implementation. Some of the applicant countries have made much progress 
with the introduction of computerised police search systems and other 
modern equipment but major deficits continue to exist in all of them. Many 
of these sources of diversity in the i mplementation of police cooperation Jörg Monar 
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standards taken individually may appear to be of limited importance but 
taken together they constitute a formidable challenge for the applicant 
countries as regards management, organisation, funding and training. 
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters.  In this area implementation is 
primarily a ffected by diversity in the application of established procedures. 
Cooperation with the Czech Republic, for instance, has encountered 
problems because of the slowness of j udicial  procedures, the lack of 
specialised knowledge and language skills among the mostly younger 
judges and weaknesses in the quality of application of procedural rules. 
Language problems, lengthy procedures and major delays in returning 
official are a common problem in current judicial cooperation with most of 
the applicant countries. The delays and weaknesses as regards procedures 
of cooperation are partly to be explained by the above mentioned 
organisational weaknesses of the judiciary (see above section II.3.), 
insufficient manpower and bureaucratic obstacles, but they are also caused 
by lack of adequate training of judges and officials in the specificities of 
international cooperation. Practitioners from current EU Member States 
have also reported considerable variations in the willingness of authorities 
in the applicant countries to effectively cooperate in legal assistance 
matters. Further delays in active participation in cross-border judicial 
cooperation could result in insufficient expertise at the time o f accession 
and increase the risks of diversity after accession. 
III.  Instruments and strategies for reducing or  
managing diversity in the context of the  
eastward enlargement 
1.  Instruments and strategies before accession 
Although the extent of the challenges of enlargement in the areas of justice 
and home affairs had already become fairly clear after the submission of 
the Langdon Report to the European Commission in October 1995
19 and 
 
19  SEC(6)96, a consultancy report drawn up by the former British Home Office 
official J. Langdon. EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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although the  “structured dialogues” with the applicant countries had led to 
little progress in this area it took the EU until 1997 to take the first 
substantial action on pre-accession help through a major reorientation of 
the PHARE programme. Since then a range of instruments aimed at 
reducing diversity have been adapted or  newly introduced. They - and their 
respective problems - can be summarised as follows: 
Monitoring instruments. Monitoring and evaluation of the applicant is 
obviously crucial to the identification of diversity problems and as a basis 
for EU pre-accession a ction and positions in the accession negotiations. 
The most sophisticated of the existing evaluation mechanisms is the 
already mentioned  “collective evaluation” mechanism of the Council set up 
in 1998 which allows to identify major problems of diversity especially in 
the areas of implementation and organisational structures. The Regular 
Reports of the European Commission on the progress made by the 
applicant countries focus slightly more on the reduction of diversity in the 
legislative area.  
Problems: The  “collective evaluation” of the Council tends to focus on 
current deficits of the applicant countries and fails often to take into 
account their potential to reduce diversity before accession. It also fails to 
provide any recommendations on ways and priorities for reducing the 
existing d iversity . Its effectiveness as a political instrument is limited by 
the strict confidentiality of the reports produced. There is as yet little cross-
fertilisation between the collective valuation and the design and 
implementation of EU pre-accession aid measures. The Commission 
Reports lack substance and are at best giving the applicant countries 
encouraging political signals to step up preparations in certain broad areas. 
Pre-accession aid instruments.  These include measures under the PHARE 
programme and specific Third Pillar justice and home affairs programmes 
such as GROTIUS, OISIN and FALCONE. These aid instruments have so 
far focused on the transfer of expertise ( “pre-accession advisers”, twinning 
programmes), specific training measures and - to a lesser extent - help with 
the upgrading of technical equipment. Last year a Council Regulation
20 
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also enabled the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA) to transfer its know-how to applicant countries. The 
pre-accession aid instruments are in general highly appreciated by the 
applicant countries  - especially as regards know-how transfer  - and are 
making a substantial contribution to the applicant countries’ understanding 
what will be required from them on the implementation and structural side. 
Problems: The use of these instruments is not embedded in an effective 
overall strategy, so that measures often respond more to fragmented 
interests of the individual applicant countries than to overall cross-country 
priorities (for instance: EU help with upgrading border post electronic data 
networks in Hungary but not in Poland or Slovenia). EU measures are also 
often badly coordinated with bilateral aid measures provided by individual 
Member States (e.g. Germany-Poland). Much of the PHARE funds used in 
the justice and home affairs area go into internal market related reforms of 
the administrative and judicial systems rather than to be focused on specific 
justice and home affairs diversity problems. The Third Pillar  programmes 
also suffer from relatively small budgets. 
Instruments of pre-accession association.  The earlier applicant countries 
can gain practical experience with the functioning of EU institutions and 
procedures the easier it becomes for them to adapt their own structures and 
procedures in view of a more effective participation from the time of 
accession. Instruments of pre-accession association have so far included 
improved information of the applicants about EU decision-making in 
justice and home affairs at senior official level and their partial 
involvement in a number of specialised bodies like CIREA (asylum), 
CIREFI (immigration) and PAPEG (organised crime). As regards 
EUROPOL the JHA Council of 15 and 16 March 2001 gave green light for 
the Director of Europol to negotiate agreements with Hungary and Poland 
which will include the transmission of personal data to each of them.
21 The 
Council Decision of 22 D ecember 2000 establishing the European Police 
College (CEPOL)
22 also emphasised the need for CEPOL to develop 
 
21  Council document no. 6757/01. 
22  OJ No. L 336 of 30.12.2000. EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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quickly a relationship with n ational training institutes in applicant countries 
in view of preparing the a pplicant’s police forces for an effective 
participation in EU police cooperation. In March 2001 EU ministers also 
came out in favour of a participation of the applicant countries in the 
EMCDDA.  
Problems: The current forms of association keep the applicant countries 
outside of all more operational elements of EU cooperation, mainly 
because of concerns over data-protection and corruption. This l imits the 
learning effects and causes frustration on the side of participants from the 
applicant countries.  Differentiation between candidate countries as regards 
the degree of association  - such as the priority given to the association of 
Hungary and Poland with Europol  - tends to create tensions over what is 
perceived as unequal treatment.  
The 1998 Pre-accession Pact on Organised Crime.
23 This is a so far unique 
multi-disciplinary instrument of cooperation in the area of the fight against 
organised crime  which is aimed at transferring both know-how and EU 
implementation standards to the applicant countries in order to reduce 
potential diversity in implementation problems after accession. Under the 
terms of the Pact the EU-15 and the applicants have agreed  to develop, 
with the assistance of Europol, a common annual strategy in order to 
identify the most significant common threats in relation to organised crime, 
increased exchange of law-enforcement intelligence and mutual practical 
support as regards training and equipment assistance, joint investigative 
activities and special operations, facilitating trans-boundary law 
enforcement cooperation and judicial cooperation, and mutual e xchange of 
law enforcement officers and judicial authorities for traineeships.  The 
applicant countries have also undertaken to engage in further institutional 
adaptation to the EU acquis and to step up preparations for their accession 
to the Europol Convention at the time of accession. It has on the whole 
proved to be useful and could serve as a model for pre-accession pacts in 
other sensitive areas such as asylum or illegal immigration. 
 
23  Pre-accession pact on organised crime between the Member States of the European 
Union and the applicant countries [...], OJ No. C 220/1 of 15.7.1998. Jörg Monar 
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Problems: The Pre-accession Pact is limited to organised crime, establishes 
not enough bridges to judicial cooperation and other organised crime 
relevant cooperation areas and suffers from a lack of specific funding 
programmes. 
The accession negotiations. These can also be regarded as an instrument in 
the sense that the EU uses the negotiations to put pressure on the applicant 
countries not to relent w ith their efforts of adoption of the EU acquis in 
justice and home affairs. There have been thinly veiled threats that failure 
to comply with the entire acquis could delay accession. 
Problems: The accession negotiations are focused more on the adoption of 
the formal legal acquis than on the implementation problems which are 
much more difficult to assess and to negotiate on. This encourages 
applicant countries to concentrate on satisfying the EU’s formal acquis 
demands rather than effective implementation capabilities and mechanisms. 
The EU’s insistence on implementation capabilities is often seen as very 
imprecise criterion which can be rather softened or toughened rather 
arbitrarily. 
The EU has never formally adopted a comprehensive pre-accession 
strategy f or the areas of justice and home affairs encompassing all these 
instruments. On the basis of the large number of Council and Commission 
documents adopted on enlargement issues and of the action taken so far 
two basic elements of strategy can be identified: 
 
(A)  The central objective remains the full adoption and implementation 
of the EU/Schengen by the applicant countries upon accession.  
(B)  This objective is to be pursued both by putting pressure on the 
applicant countries (mainly in the context of the accession 
negotiations) and a combination of the main types of instruments 
mentioned above. 
In order to be successful any enlargement strategy has to be realistic, 
credible and efficient as regards its means. Under each of these criteria 
current EU strategy shows certain weaknesses:  EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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Is this strategy realistic? It seems quite likely that diversity in terms of 
legislation will have largely been eliminated upon accession. Because of 
the political pressure on the applicants during the negotiations diversity in 
policies will not come fully to bear before accession. The extent of 
organisational diversity may also be reduced to a significant before 
accession, especially if the EU steps up its pre-accession help. Yet the 
diversity in i mplementation capabilities is such that it seems totally 
unrealistic at this stage to expect even  “first wave” candidate countries to 
meet all the i mplementation standards applied in the EU/Schengen context. 
Is this strategy credible? The applicant countries are well aware that there 
are differences of position within the EU on the acquis question. The 
British Government, for instance, as a non-member of the Schengen border 
control system is well known to favour a more flexible attitude as regards 
the adoption of the Schengen standards by the applicant countries. Even 
more important is that it has by now become fairly clear that the Schengen 
members are not going to lift their current tight external border controls 
towards the new Member States immediately at the time of accession. 
While t his represents clearly a major blow for the applicant countries - they 
could regard the continuation of internal border controls on persons as a 
visible sign of continuing exclusion from Western Europe or even as a sign 
of a  “second class membership” - it  also constitutes an implicit admission 
that the Schengen group’s insistence on a full Schengen implementation 
capability upon accession is not any longer a realistic objective. With this 
admission the current  “maximalist” strategy loses a substantial part  of its 
credibility. 
Is this strategy efficient as regards its means? The problems indicated 
above show that there is at least considerable scope for improvement. 
Broadly speaking EU pre-accession instruments suffer from fragmentation, 
lack of coordination, different approaches of Member States which result in 
conflicting signals to the applicants and u nderfunding. In many areas there 
is no effective system of regular re-targeting, prioritising and target 
achievement evaluation. Instruments which have been r elatively successful 
in one area  - such as the Pre-accession Pact on Organised Crime - are not 
taken over in other areas. Jörg Monar 
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Alternatives to the current strategy seem both possible and worthwhile to 
consider. One possible change could apply to the primary objective. Instead 
of aiming at the full adoption and implementation of the entire 
EU/Schengen acquis the Member States could prioritise certain parts of the 
acquis and leave others to be fully met only at different times after 
accession. This seems difficult to combine with the idea of a single internal 
security area where all elements are to some extent interrelated and one 
weak link is normally often perceived as endangering the security of the 
whole. Yet such a prioritisation becomes possible if the new Member 
States will indeed be kept outside of the o perational elements of the 
Schengen border control system for some time after accession. As a result 
not only the core of the security zone element of the AFSJ would be 
temporarily taken out of the accession  process and potentially negative 
effects of diversity  - which should satisfy the internal security concerns of 
current Member States - but also the need for demanding the adoption and 
full implementation of all parts of the EU/Schengen acquis from day one of 
accession. This would give the new Member States not only more time  - 
which especially the  “first wave” candidates clearly need  - but also the 
opportunity to concentrate their scarce resources more effectively on 
certain AFSJ acquis areas before accession and to shift them to other areas 
after accession. It would be for the EU to determine which parts of the 
acquis would need to be met by accession  - constituting the  “accession 
AFSJ acquis” - and which parts would only need to be fully met before the 
new Member States will be fully admitted to the Schengen system  - 
constituting the  “post-accession AFSJ acquis”. The EU could then re-target 
its pre-accession aid measures accordingly, concentrating its own resources 
as well on the respective priority areas. The decision on what should belong 
to the “accession” and what to the “post-accession” acquis would no doubt 
be a controversial one, and the Schengen members having common borders 
with new Member States may well take the view that even with external 
border controls staying in place their security interests will be met best by 
insisting that the new Member States apply most of the acquis immediately 
upon accession. Yet it would appear sensible, for instance, to prioritise the 
new Member States’ full implementation capability in the areas of judicial EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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cooperation and police cooperation rather than to insist on a full 
implementation capability as regards the Schengen external border control 
system and participation in the Schengen Information System (SIS).  
Distinguishing between an  “accession” and a “post-accession” acquis could 
also contribute to a higher credibility of the EU strategy. With a more 
limited and therefore more realistic set of objectives as regards  
implementation capabilities  the EU’s strategy  would provide less potential 
excuses for applicant countries for not being able to meet objectives. The 
EU would be in a position to focus more effectively and credibly on a 
limited but substantial range of areas and standards to be achieved by the 
time of accession. With less extensive demands it would become more 
credible to actually treat these demands as real accession conditions, 
meaning that non-compliance would be taken as an actual ground for 
delaying accession. 
Changes of strategy should also be considered by the EU as regards pre-
accession aid. The applicant countries should be given access to all existing 
training, evaluation and pilot project programmes in the areas of justice and 
home affairs. Having regard to the fact that trafficking in human  beings is 
to a substantial extent carried out through and in the territories of some of 
the applicant countries it seems quite extraordinary that they were not right 
from the beginning involved in the important EU STOP programme which 
finances projects in  this field. It was only in the context of the informal 
EU/candidate countries ministerial justice and home affairs meeting in 
Brussels on 16 March 2001 that the EU ministers finally agreed on 
“looking into the possibility of a ssociating the candidate countries” with 
the STOP programme.
24 Consideration should also be given to an 
upgrading of funding for specific pre-accession aid in the justice and home 
affairs field. Implementation capabilities of the applicant countries are to a 
considerable extent dependent on the introduction of modern equipment 
such as the computerisation of databases, the establishment of electronic 
data links b etween border posts, consulates and central databases, 
electronic fingerprinting devices, infrared and CO
2 detectors and 
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technology for producing counterfeit-proof documents. All this r equires 
considerable investments which most of the candidates  - because of their 
adjustment burdens in other enlargement relevant areas  - are unlikely to 
come up with to the extent r equired for their effective integration into the 
AFSJ. If EU Member States really take the view that insufficient 
implementation capability of the new Member States might affect their 
own internal security it would seem sensible for them to upgrade funding 
for equipment in candidate countries as an investment into the future 
internal security of their own citizens. In this context it seems worth 
mentioning also that much of this equipment would need to be acquired in 
EU countries so that the funds would to some extent “return” into the EU. 
2.  Instruments and strategies after accession 
The eastward enlargement will inevitably import additional diversity into 
the AFSJ. Substantial diversity exists among the current Member States 
and the new Member States will add to that. After accession it will also 
become more difficult to put effective pressure on new Member States to 
further reduce diversity on their side: They will be in a position to either 
“veto” EU measures or  - in the (so far few) areas providing for qualified 
majority voting  - participate in blocking minorities. They are also likely to 
be less willing to submit to special monitoring procedures. As a result the 
management of diversity in the sense of helping the EU to cope with 
persisting or even increased levels of diversity may well become as 
important as further efforts to reduce it. It seems therefore useful to have a 
brief look at some of the available instruments:  
One  “classic” instrument of diversity management and reduction is 
majority voting. It allows to bypass diversity related blocking positions and 
to proceed with diversity r eduction even against individual national 
positions. The Treaty of Nice  - although d eclared to prepare the EU for 
enlargement  - has not brought a major breakthrough t owards majority 
voting: Pursuant to new Article 67  (5) TEC the Council will be able to 
decide by qualified m ajority (under the co-decision procedure) on asylum 
and refugee policy measures, but only once  “common rules and basic EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
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principles” have been adopted by unanimity. Article 67  (5) extends 
majority voting also to judicial cooperation in civil matters, but with the 
very substantial exception of family law. In order to reduce the risk of 
national  “vetoes” it would be i mportant to use the possibility offered by 
Article 67 (2)  TEC to pass at the end of the transitional period (May 2004) 
to qualified majority voting at least in the communitarised areas  - which 
include border control issues - before the first accessions take place. Some 
of the new Member States may not be supportive of a move towards more 
majority voting in some areas of justice and home a ffairs after having 
joined. 
Another  “classic” instrument for accommodating temporarily enlargement 
related diversity are transition periods during which certain parts of the 
acquis are not applied to the new Member States. So far the applicant 
countries have neither formally asked for such transition periods in justice 
and home affairs nor has the EU indicated its willingness to consider such 
temporary arrangements. Yet a non-application of the operational parts of 
the Schengen acquis to new Member States after accession could well be 
regarded as a sort of transitional arrangement, although it would be an 
open-ended one with the Schengen countries being unlikely to commit 
themselves to a certain date for the full integration of the new Member 
States.  
An instrument of diversity management rather than reduction is the 
principle of mutual recognition which was endorsed by the Tampere 
European Council as the cornerstone for the further development of judicial 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters. Mutual recognition  - successfully 
applied in the context of the Internal Market - is based on the acceptance of 
a significant degree of diversity in the light of the obvious difficulties and 
delays resulting from  “hard” diversity reduction through regulation. Yet it 
is a tool which cannot be applied to all areas of the AFSJ, and even in the 
judicial sphere effective EU action is likely to require a certain degree of 
harmonisation, such as minimum penalties for certain types of cross-border 
crime.  One of the most innovative diversity management instruments is 
“closer cooperation”. Introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam and partially Jörg Monar 
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reformed by the Treaty of Nice
25 which has removed the possibility of 
national vetoes against the setting-up of such cooperation frameworks, it 
appears very much as a double-edged instrument in the context of diversity 
in justice and home affairs. On the one hand, if a group of Member States is 
formed which use the institutions, procedures and legal instruments of the 
EU to develop a new acquis which applies only to those Member States 
participating this inevitably introduces a powerful new element of diversity 
into the political and legal system of the EU. Any potential benefit of the 
reduction or even elimination of diversity between some Member States 
only and in certain areas only has as its negative side the introduction into 
the EU system of new fault lines of exclusion and inclusion and additional 
elements of fragmentation of the legal order.  “Closer cooperation” as a 
simple device to accommodate diversity carries a considerable risk of 
weakening the unity and effectiveness of the EU’s political and legal 
system on a lasting basis and should therefore be avoided. Yet, on the other 
hand, it has also to be recognised that this form of differentiation can 
generate new legislation, mechanisms and standards which  - if developed 
successfully and later taken over by most or all of the Member States - can 
both help with the management and the reduction of diversity in the EU as 
a whole. The basic principles of the 1990 Dublin Convention may be taken 
as an example in this context. They were first negotiated in the Schengen 
context and then taken over by all Member States as  an EU Convention. 
Such  “vanguard” or  “laboratory” closer cooperation could therefore play a 
useful role if diversity problems in the context of the eastward enlargement 
would risk to paralyse the further development of the AFSJ. Nothing 
should prevent a number of Member States (the minimum will be eight 
after the Treaty of Nice) to go ahead, for instance, with the introduction and 
recognition of a European enforcement order or a European arrest warrant 
if not all of the Member States want or are able to take this step at the same 
time. It should not be excluded that some old Member States might set up 
“closer cooperation” frameworks on some issues which some new Member 
States find, for whatever reason, uncomfortable. Yet it would need to be 
 
25  Articles 40 TEU, 43 TEU and 11 TEC (Treaty of Nice: Articles 40-40b and 43-43b 
TEU, 11 and 11 a TEC). EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Eastward Enlargement 
 35 
made sure that such  “closer cooperation” is really only a measure of  “last 
resort”  - a condition which has been strengthened by the Treaty of Nice  - 
after all efforts to proceed in common have failed and that there are no 
lasting exclusion effects.  
As regards potential post-accession strategies on diversity management and 
reduction this is largely a matter for speculation at the present stage. The 
use of the above mentioned instruments - and possibly a range of others - 
will depend on the political will of the enlarged Union to proceed with 
deeper integration in the context of the AFSJ and the balance between 
diversity reduction and diversity toleration it will be aiming at.  
IV. Conclusion 
The development of the AFSJ has clearly become one of the most 
important and rapidly developing political projects of the EU, especially 
because it correlates to some of the primary concerns of European citizens. 
It is all the more important to arrive at an effective integration of the new 
Member States into this “area” which is dealing with essential public goods 
such as internal security. Whereas the EU might need to reconsider both its 
maximalist strategy and its approach to pre-accession aid, the applicant 
countries will have to accept that this is a very sensitive area for the EU in 
which not many compromises may be on offer and in which they will have 
to accept a substantial waiting period in the Schengen ante-room.  
It may be appropriate to conclude this contribution on the issue of trust. 
The progress which the EU has achieved so far as regards cross-border 
cooperation between law e nforcement and judicial authorities and the 
build-up of the extensive information e xchange mechanisms which are 
central to the further development of the AFSJ has only been possible on 
the basis of a growing and often not easily acquired mutual trust in the 
reliability of partners, the respect of confidentiality rules and the 
compatibility of basic standards as regards working procedures and the 
implementation of common decisions. Should the enlargement lead to the 
import of too high a d egree of diversity in standards and capabilities this 
crucial factor of trust could well be eroded. The result could be protective Jörg Monar 
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measures by individual Member States or groups of Member States which 
would put into jeopardy  both the current structure of the AFSJ and its 
further development. The loser would be the European citizen - in both the 
old and the new Member States.  
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